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 The Decline of Soft Inheritance 
 Scott Gilbert 
 Soft inheritance sounds opposed to hard fact, a weak analogue kind of inheritance 
as opposed to the digital inheritance of the chromosomes. But there was, in fact, a 
 “ soft, ” developmental version of inheritance during the early twentieth century, and 
evolution was understood by many leading biologists in terms of the rules of devel-
opment. In 1893, the evolutionary champion Thomas Huxley wrote,  “ Evolution is 
not a speculation but a fact; and it takes place by epigenesis. ” He didn’t say that it 
takes place by natural selection: he said that it takes place by epigenesis, by develop-
ment. He was looking at a level different from the struggle of variations within a 
population. Rather, he was looking at the origin of variation. 
 Before World War I, the fi elds of genetics and development were united in the 
science of heredity ( Coleman 1971 ;  Gilbert, Opitz, and Raff 1996 ). There were many 
modes of inheritance, and one of the most popular and most researched was the 
mode called the morphogenetic fi eld. One of the major research programs was 
 Gestaltungsgesetze , the attempt to discover the laws by which ordered form was 
established at each generation. 
 A morphogenetic fi eld was assumed to have defi nite boundaries, and to be 
made up from a collection of cells that were specifi ed in a way that told them 
that they were members of the fi eld. The interactions of these cells led to the 
formation of a particular organ, and at each generation, fi elds were established 
for the creation of body parts. The model organism in which the inheritance of 
morphogenetic fi elds was studied was the fl atworm  Planaria . The fl atworm splits 
by binary fi ssion — either transverse or lengthwise — and each part regenerates the 
other part. A head will regenerate a tail, and a tail will regenerate a head. In 
 Planaria , the inherited information was embodied in the gradient that enabled 
the organism to form a head at one end and a tail at the other. Upon splitting, 
each half inherited the ability to make a whole and properly organized animal. 
This is reproduction, inheritance, and development all wrapped in one (see  Child 
1915, 1941 ). This notion of heredity was based on cells, not chromosomes, as the 
focal units of inheritance. Cells were seen as organizing into morphogenetic fi elds, 
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and the morphogenetic fi elds then formed organs ( Gilbert, Opitz, and Raff 1996; 
Gilbert  2003 ). 
 The genetics program of biology was originally in direct opposition to the concept 
of morphogenetic fi elds, and the demise of the morphogenetic fi eld approach in the 
United States was linked to the rise of genetics and to the research and writings of 
an eminent American embryologist-turned-geneticist, Thomas Hunt Morgan. At the 
turn of the last century, there were two main researchers studying morphogenetic 
fi elds in the United States: C.M. Childs at the University of Chicago and Thomas 
Hunt Morgan, then at Bryn Mawr College. At the beginning of his career, Morgan 
studied embryogenesis and regeneration, and he published several important arti-
cles and books on these subjects. However, in the early twentieth century Morgan 
abandoned the study of regeneration and lost belief in the ability of embryogenesis 
to serve as the scientifi c basis for the understanding of evolution. He started study-
ing the genetics of  Drosophila, where inheritance of variant traits (e.g., red versus 
white eye color) was shown to obey Mendel ’ s laws and suggested the involvement 
of nuclear chromosomes. At fi rst, he attempted to place his new mutations into a 
framework of development (see  Falk and Schwartz 1993 ). Each of his mutant phe-
notypes was seen to represent a different developmental step on the way to the fi nal 
phenotype. A mutation represented a frustrated developmental pathway. However, 
by 1913, Morgan realized that he, too, was frustrated in his attempts to make a 
unifi ed genetics of transmission and development. In 1926 he claimed that genetics 
and the study of ontogeny have to be separated ( Morgan 1926 ;  Gilbert 1998 ). He 
then called the  Planaria program unscientifi c and blocked the attempts of Child and 
his students to publish their fi ndings. He considered such work old-fashioned and 
not good science ( Mitman and  Fausto-Sterling 1992 ). Indeed, Mitman and Fausto-
Sterling sternly conclude that Morgan was so adamant in his ridiculing the fi eld 
notion because, in the 1930s, the morphogenetic fi eld was an alternative to the gene 
as the unit of ontogeny. 
 In order to see how the fi eld notion and soft, developmentally constructed inheri-
tance were removed from the evolutionary synthesis in the United States, we need 
to go to one of the founding narratives of genetics.  “ The Rise of Genetics ” ( Morgan 
 1932b ) could have been subtitled  “ The Decline of Embryology, ” because in this 
article, as well as in  The Scientifi c Basis of Evolution  ( Morgan 1932a ), Morgan por-
trays embryology, and soft inheritance with it, as a failed research program. Genetics, 
he claims, is its victorious successor. Indeed,  The Scientifi c Basis of Evolution was 
about what Morgan regarded as the  only scientifi c basis for evolution — genetics. 
Everything else was the  unscientifi c basis of evolution. Paleontology, morphology, 
and embryology were all considered to be  “ philosophical ” old schools:  “ older specu-
lative methods of treating evolution as a problem of history ” ( Morgan 1932a : 13 ). 
Genetics, however,  “ has brought that subject evolution an exact scientifi c method 
of procedure ” ( Morgan 1932b: 287 ). 
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 Morgan tells a story, which would be amplifi ed later by Dobzhansky and Mayr, 
about the rise of genetics and the fall of embryology and the developmental modes 
of inheritance. This story follows what philosophers of religion call the supersession-
ist paradigm, the narrative myth by which the early Christians claimed to have 
superseded the Jews, and the narrative by which Protestants later claimed to have 
evolved or developed past the Catholics. Morgan starts by redefi ning embryology 
as a science of gene expression (something that embryologists had not looked at), 
and having redefi ned it in such a way that it can ’ t succeed, claims that genetics has 
superseded it. Moreover, all the things that embryology wanted to explain and had 
failed to do, genetics could do ( Gilbert 1998 ). 
 When Morgan claimed in 1926 that heredity had to be split into genetics and 
embryology, he redefi ned both areas in terms of genes. Genetics was the science of 
gene transmission, and embryology was the science of gene expression. Then he 
claimed that the embryologists could not bridge the gap between the genes and the 
trait, which, in fact,  was not what embryologists wanted to do. Embryologists were 
dealing with morphogenetic fi elds and cells, not with genes. (Indeed, many embry-
ologists were distinctly anti-genetic and felt that the cytoplasm, not the genes, 
directed development.) Embryology,  Morgan (1932a) said, ran a while after false 
gods and landed in a maze of ontological subtleties. Where embryology went 
into metaphysical subtleties, genetics went into concrete chemistry and math. It is 
noteworthy, however, that in the 1930s the gene was not any more  “ material ” than 
the fi eld. Neither  “ fi eld ” nor  “ gene ” had been directly observed. Both were postu-
lated on the basis of results of experimental data, and both sought to explain 
inheritance. 
 Mendelian genetics was very successful in explaining the inheritance of many 
traits, but there were hereditary phenomena that did not fi t into its framework. It 
is fi tting to recall that this year (2009) is the centenary of Wolterek ’ s paper on phe-
notypic plasticity and the notion that what is inherited are potentials for develop-
ment, and those potentials can be impacted by the environment. The example 
studied by Wolterek was the water fl ea  Daphnia ( Woltereck 1909 ). It develops in 
different ways in different environments: when the individual lives in a safe environ-
ment, it has a normal round head, but in an environment inhabited by predators it 
grows a protective helmet. And this developmental response is passed on to the 
next generation. It is not easy to explain this mode of inheritance within the classical 
framework of chromosomal inheritance. But these kinds of fi ndings can be conve-
niently ignored if they do not fi t into one ’ s theoretical scheme. And they were often 
ignored. As  Benkemoun and Saupe (2006) commented when discussing past work 
on the genetics of fungi,  “ exceptions ” were routinely autoclaved. We do not treasure 
our exceptions, as William Bateson urged us to do. We autoclave them. 
 The Cold War and the rise of Lysenkoism in the Soviet Union provided much of 
the context in which genetics fl ourished and in which  “ soft inheritance ” was mar-
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ginalized or discredited ( see  Gilbert and Epel 2009 ). Due to the possible mutational 
aspects of radiation, the Atomic Energy Commission was responsible for funding 
many projects of population genetics in the United States, and in 1959 the American 
Genetics Society hired a public relations team to spread the good news of genetics: 
not to bad-mouth Lysenkoism, because the American geneticists feared that their 
colleagues in Russia would be hurt that way, but to tell that Mendel plus Darwin 
gives you evolution (Wolfe 2002; Gormley 2007.) Clearly, to stop a competing 
research program, you need not kill the scientists; killing their research funding will 
do.  
 And, of course, one can also write a historical narrative into which the competing 
data do not fi t. This, as we saw, was one of the strategies of Morgan, soon followed 
by Dobzhansky and Mayr (Sapp 1987).  Dobzhansky (1937) wrote a history of evo-
lutionary biology, largely the history of experimental population genetics, saying 
that evolution is studied by looking at changes in gene frequency, and concluded by 
1951 that  “ evolution is a change in the genetic composition of a population. The 
study of the mechanisms of evolution falls within the province of population genet-
ics ” ( Dobzhansky 1951: 16 ). So we have a proper subset. Evolution is a proper subset 
of the mathematics of population genetics. 
 While Morgan and Dobzhansky wrote developmental mechanisms out of the 
history of evolution, Ernst Mayr wrote embryology and soft inheritance out of the 
philosophy of evolution ( Mayr 1966 ,  1982 ). Embryology was seen to be mired — 
pardon the pun — in typological thinking rather than population thinking. It was, 
Mayr claimed, essentialist. But, as Polly  Winsor (2006) has shown, in order to keep 
evolutionary biology focused on intrapopulation processes, Mayr invented a dichot-
omy that had actually been resolved well before the time of Darwin. Although Mayr 
did not think that evolution was merely a matter of changes in gene frequencies, his 
analysis led him to focus only on evolutionary/genetic changes within species. He 
maintained that evolution could be studied without paying any attention to the 
mechanisms by which genotypes generate phenotypes (Mayr 1982). And since evo-
lution had no need for a theory of body construction, it had no need for the pos-
sibilities of soft inheritance. 
 We now can observe that inheritance can be affected by several means. DNA 
methylation can inactivate a gene as well as mutation, and gene methylation differ-
ences (epialleles) can be inherited from one generation to the next. Moreover, 
symbionts provide a parallel system of inheritance, and in many cases the symbionts 
can alter gene expression in their hosts or provide various proteins to their cells 
(see  Jablonka and Raz 2009 ;  Gilbert and Epel 2009 ; chapter 27 this volume). Here, 
variation can be provided by  “ soft inheritance. ” This analysis could not have been 
accomplished without restriction enzyme analysis, polymerase chain reaction, and 
high-throughput RNA analysis. It is therefore ironic that the most reductionist, the 
The Decline of Soft Inheritance 125
most analytical, molecular tools have actually ended up showing the necessity, and 
indeed the reality, of the soft inheritance that had been excluded from the study of 
evolution. 
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